There is a review of the Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism up on NDPR, written by Greg Frost-Arnold. The review makes the book sound fairly appealing. I wanted to comment on one thing. Towards the end there is a brief discussion of Richardson’s article which is on the relationship between Kuhn and the logical positivists. The question is why Structure was taken to be damaging to the positivists. The review notes that Structure of Scientific Revolutions appeared in the Vienna Circle’s encyclopedia, Carnap felt it fit with his own views, and none of the positivists published negative reviews. I would like to add something to that. Hempel’s 1966 Philosophy of Natural Science, an intro book in the same series as Quine’s Philosophy of Logic, argues for many similar things that Kuhn’s book does. There are differences enough, but, for example, some of what Hempel says about theory testing fits right in with what Kuhn says about paradigms. Of course, Hempel always couches things in terms of theories and doesn’t take as radical a view as Kuhn with respect to theory change, but there is a fair amount of alignment. In fact, there is much more than I antecedently thought going into Hempel’s book.