This is a follow up to the previous post on Fregean epistemology of math. I want to rehearse a problem for the view, and a tentative response. I’m doubtful that the objection is original to me and would welcome a pointer to a discussion of the issue. The post went on for too long, so I decided to break it up into two parts. The second will follow soon.

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My break from blogging ended up slightly exceeding the planned time.  I hope I didn’t lose all my readers. 

I met my deadlines but needed to take some extra time to get back on top of other things. The upshot is that I think I’ve got some direction on research, which will likely make it into future posts. Substantive posting will resume this evening.

I’m not going to put up any of my own new content for another week or two yet, but there is a link I’d like to put up. Mark Wilson has a review of Fodor’s LOT 2 up on NDPR. It is fairly critical, mainly about the changes Fodor’s view (and argumentative style) have undergone since the first Language of Thought. It does a pretty good job of illustrating some of Wilson’s views that appear in his big book.

I’m going on a short blog hiatus to deal with some upcoming deadlines. I’ll resume posting in two to three weeks. In the mean time, I’ll leave a few links.

In The Semantic Tradition, Coffa says the following about neo-Kantianism that was too good to pass up. It comes just after a discussion of Helmholtz’s criticisms of Kant’s views on geometry:

When the Germans began to recover from idealism, the first that occurred to them was to go back to Kant and start over again, trying to get it right this time. ‘Neo-Kantianism’ is the blanket name for a variety of movements that had little more in common than a distrust of the post-Kantians who preceded them and the belief that what Kant meant (but didn’t quite manage to say) was profound and true.

Coffa goes on to say that, in this broad sense, Helmholtz initiated a neo-Kantian movement. Coffa has such a way with words.

I’m reading through Ferreiros’s Labyrinth of Thought. It is so far a decent history of the early development of set theory, beginning with Riemann and Dedekind.

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This is an attempt to think through some topics from the philosophy of math seminar I’m attending.

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If you are in the Pittsburgh area, you’ve probably already heard about this. The weekend of April 3-4, Pitt will be hosting a conference in honor of Nuel Belnap, called “Logics of Consequence.” The speaker line-up consists mostly of Belnap’s students, and it is quite impressive. A selection: Mike Dunn, Phil Kremer, and Alasdair Urquhart. There are also others coming for discussion. I, for one, am quite excited.

Here is a post I had written a while ago, but never put up on this blog. It touches on some odd things that Russell says, primarily as they relate to Frege and Benacerraf’s subsequent discussion.  Read the rest of this entry »

A topic that recurs in the interviews with Quine is his views on analyticity and how his views have changed since “Two Dogmas”.

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Shawn Standefer, recent Ph.D. in philosophy from Pitt. (More about me)